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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000889-CA

vs.
TARA KAY MAST,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of theft by receiving stolen property, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999), in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston,
presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did defendant admit responsibility for criminal conduct beyond the offense
of conviction, and did the trial court properly order restitution based on that
admission?
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. "We will not
vacate an order of restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded

its authority. However, if the trial court's order is premised on statutory
interpretation . . . we afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review
for correctness." State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, | 6 , 992 P.2d 995 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether a defendant's admissions
sufficiently establish the criminal responsibility to support a restitution order is a
question of law. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, | 5 , 987 P.2d 1289; cf.
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998)
2. Did the trial court's restitution order violate defendant's due process
rights?
Whether the trial court's restitution order violated defendant's due process
rights is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Parra, 972 P.2d
924, 927 (reviewing due process challenge of eyewitness's identification).
3. In the event resentencing is required, may the court, in its discretion,
reinstate the fine and recoupment fee suspended to facilitate payment of the original
restitution order? May the sentencing court order restitution for lost wages for time
the victim spent with the police, in court, and at his bank?
Whether the court has discretion to reinstate the fine and recoupment is a
question of law reviewable for correctness. See State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179
(Utah 1981). The lost wages issue is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed
for correctness. See Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343 at f 6.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-201 (1999);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-408 (1999).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS1
Victim Curtis Belnap was defendant's former boyfriend. R. 17. They had
known one another since meeting in Odyssey House, an alcohol and drug
rehabilitation program, approximately ten years earlier. See R. 17, 37; PSI at 3, 8.
Defendant came to see the victim when she was having marital difficulties in 1999.
PSI at 3. He "let her into [his] house and was a friend to her." Id. She knew
"exactly where to find things in [his] house." Id.
On February 3, 2000, Belnap's home was burglarized. Among the items
taken were checks, four men's rings, a gold pocket watch, a large water bottle
containing approximately $3500 in cash, two stereo speakers, and a day planner.
PSI at 2, 4. Later that day, defendant was apprehended presenting one of Belnap's
stolen checks to purchase items at a Salt Lake County Target store. PSI at 2.
The "Official Version of Offense," included in the Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report, details what happened after police were called. During questioning by a
1

Except as otherwise annotated, the facts recited here are taken from the PreSentence Investigative Report.
3

police officer, defendant said that she needed to use the restroom and asked to
retrieve a feminine pad from her purse. The officer said he would retrieve it for her
and asked where it was. She pointed to a small black pouch. When the officer
picked it up, defendant quickly grabbed it. The officer stated that he needed to
check the contents. After some hesitation, defendant gave it to him. Inside the
pouch he found four men's rings and a pocket watch. PSI at 2. When asked whose
they were, defendant said that they were hers. Id. Belnap was later contacted. He
described the items and reported they were taken from his home during the burglary
the same day defendant was arrested. Id.
After being advised of her Miranda rights, defendant claimed that a male
friend had given her the checks and the jewelry, but that she could not remember his
name or provide a description of him. Id. She recounted that this male friend had
been with her at the store, but had left, telling her to pay for the items with one of
the checks he had given her. Id. Defendant stated that she knew the checks were
stolen. She said she knew Belnap, but denied any knowledge of the burglary earlier
that day. Id.
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery and one count of theft by
receiving stolen property. R. 2. She pled guilty to theft by receiving stolen
property, and the forgery count was dismissed. R. 23. She was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years, fined $1000, and assessed $200

4

for recoupment of attorneys' fees. R. 45-46; 70:13. Despite defense counsel's
objections, the court ordered her to pay $5,090 in restitution. R. 70:8-9. This figure
represented $40 for replacement of stolen checks; $400 for lost wages for time the
victim spent with the police, courts, and bank; and $4650 for certain items taken in
the burglary—$3500 cash, stereo speakers valued at $1100, and a $50 day planner.
See PSI at 4.
The judge then suspended the prison term, but imposed a 180-day jail term.
He "suspended] payment of the fine and . . . fees recoupment, assuming that
[defendant was] going to pay restitution in an amount greater than—than those
amounts." R. 70:13-14; see also R. 71:3 ("I suspended—was it $1000 for the
fine . . . . [in] anticipation of [defendant's] paying the $5000 in restitution");
R. 71:13 ("as a practical matter, it's going to be impossible for you to pay a fine as
well as the restitution and it's more important that the restitution get paid").
Restitution was discussed at sentencing and at a hearing on defendant's
motion to amend or alter judgment. R. 70, 71. Defense counsel argued that
defendant had not admitted to participating in the burglary and therefore could not
be ordered to pay restitution for the items taken in the burglary. See R. 70:9;
71:8-9.
Based on his reading of the presentence report and his questioning of
defendant, the trial judge found that defendant had "participated] in a criminal

5

activity resulting in [the] economic loss . . . ordered by this Court." R. 71:13. He
found defendant's story of how she acquired the stolen items "simply unreasonable
and unbelievable." Id. He found that she was "disingenuous, if not dishonest," had
"misrepresented] the facts," and was apparently "flat-out untruthful." R. 71:10-11.
He found it "farcical and whimsical to believe for a moment that someone she
[didn't] even know well enough to know his name" or "even describe him" gave her
valuable jewelry "just for the flm of it." R. 71:11-12.
When the sentencing judge rehearsed defendant's story and then asked her
whether it sounded plausible, defendant admitted that it was "pretty far-fetched."
R. 70:12. When she insisted that she didn't know who committed the burglary, but
that her boyfriend, "Braden, . . . had nothing to do with this," the judge asked "How
do you know that? If you don't know who did it, then you wouldn't know that he
didn't do it." R. 70:12-13. Defendant conceded "Well, okay." R. 70:13.
Defendant then returned to her earlier claim that she "[didn't] know." Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Defendant admitted lying about her receipt of stolen goods. By admitting
to the lie, she admitted responsibility for criminal conduct, i.e., concealing or aiding
in concealing stolen property. Defendant's admitted criminal conduct is causally
related to the victim's damages and supports the restitution order.

6

2. Application of the restitution statute does not violate due process. The
court's restitution order was supported by defendant's plea and by her admissions to
additional criminal conduct. Defendant had an opportunity to be heard regarding
the scope of her responsibility for damages occasioned by her conviction and by the
criminal conduct to which she admitted.
3. Should this court require resentencing, it should instruct that fines
suspended to facilitate payment of the original restitution order may be reinstated
and clarify that restitution may be ordered for the victim's lost wages.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The court properly ordered restitution based on defendant's
admitted criminal conduct.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering restitution for items
taken in the burglary, but not in defendant's possession at the time of arrest. Br.
Aplt. at 9-12. Defendant asserts that she cannot be held responsible for the losses
occasioned by the burglary because she did not admit participating in it. Id. at 1213.
In Utah and in most other jurisdictions, a defendant convicted of receiving
stolen goods cannot, on that basis alone, be required to pay restitution for damages
caused by a related burglary—e.g., for stolen property other than the property
received. See, e.g., J MM. v. State (In re J MM.), 924 P.2d 895, 896-97 (Utah App.
7

1996) (applying juvenile restitution statute, but observing that analysis was
comparable to discussions in criminal restitution context); Commonwealth v. Reed,
543 A.2d 587, 589 (Pa. Super. 1988). In the absence of evidence or an admission
linking a defendant to the related burglary, no basis exists for holding the defendant
responsible for the damages it caused. See In re J.M.H., 924 P.2d at 897; see also
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993) (stating that "restitution
should be ordered only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where
commission of the crime establishes causality of the injury or damages").
In this case, however, defendant did more than receive stolen property. She
told the police that she had been at Target with the male friend who gave her the
jewelry and checks, but that she could not remember his name or describe him. PSI
at 2. She recounted this story to the sentencing judge, but then conceded that her
story was "far-fetched." R. 70:12. She thus lied about the circumstances
surrounding her receipt of stolen property. Her lies helped conceal other property
stolen in the burglary and hindered the apprehension of the burglars. This conduct
is criminal. It provides a proper basis for holding defendant responsible for the
burglary damages.
Utah law mandates restitution for criminal activities which include, in addition
to offenses for which a defendant is convicted, other criminal conduct for which a
defendant admits responsibility—with or without an admission of committing the

8

criminal conduct. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (1999) details the controlling
provisions. The statute first defines "criminal activities" as used in the section:
"Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
Id. at § 76-3-201(1 )(b) (emphasis added). It then articulates the restitution
requirement:
When a person is convicted of a criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of crime . . . .
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i). Finally, the statute reiterates that the court must include
admitted criminal conduct when it determines restitution:
For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the
offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to
the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay
restitution. . . .
§ 76-3-20l(8)(a) (emphasis added).
Under these provisions, a court must order restitution not only for damages
occasioned by the offense of conviction, but also for damages occasioned by any
criminal conduct for which a defendant admits responsibility. A defendant need not
admit to committing the criminal conduct, merely responsibility for it.
Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property; more significantly for
purposes of this appeal, defendant also admitted responsibility for criminal conduct.

9

She conceded that the story that she told the police at the time of her arrest and that
she later recounted to the court was "far-fetched." While defendant did not candidly
state that she lied, her concession to having told a "far-fetched" story is an
admission, by way of euphemistic language, to lying. Her false statements
concerned the circumstances under which she received the stolen goods in her
possession. She may, indeed, have lied about her personal participation in the
burglary; but, at the very least, she lied about her knowledge of the person from
whom she received the stolen goods. By so lying, she aided in the concealment of
stolen property, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-409 (1999) and a criminal
offense causally related to the victim's losses.2
The statute outlines the elements of this offense: "A person commits theft if
[she] . . . conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding . . . property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it." Id. at § 76-6-408(1). The term "conceal"
should not be "interpreted in a technical sense, but rather includes all acts done
which render the discovery or identification of the stolen property more difficult."
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 232 n.6 (Utah 1980). A defendant who falsely states

2

It is not clear whether the trial court considered defendant's concealing acts
evidence of her participation in the burglary or of a separate criminal act. This court may
affirm the trial court's decision, however, "if it is sustainable on any legal ground . . .
even [if different] from that stated by the trial court." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,
^[12 n.6, 12 P.3d 110 (citation omitted).
10

that she does not know some information relevant to a theft aids in the concealment
of stolen property, thereby violating the statute. See id. at 231-32 & n.5.
Defendant here falsely stated that she did not know and could not describe the
person from whom she received the stolen goods. She thereby gave false
information relevant to the theft, aiding in concealing stolen property.
Further, a causal relationship exists between defendant's admitted criminal
offense and the losses suffered by the burglary victim. Defendant's lies regarding
the circumstances under which she received the jewelry and checks "aided in
concealing" the other property taken in the burglary. Had she told the truth, the
property may have been recovered. Further, her lies hindered police efforts to
apprehend the burglars. Had they been apprehended and convicted, the court could
have required restitution from them. Defendant's lies helped close this avenue for
recovering the victim's losses.
While it is not absolutely certain that, absent defendant's criminal conduct, the
stolen property would have been recovered or the burglars discovered, convicted,
and ordered to pay restitution, the causal relationship between defendant's criminal
conduct and the victim's pecuniary damages was sufficient to support the restitution
order. Cf. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1997) (finding causal
connection between defendant's conviction of joyriding and victim's loss when car
was impounded and then sold); State ex rel Juvenile Dep 7 v. Dickerson, 784 P.2d
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1121, 1122 (Or. App. 1990) (stating, in interpreting the Oregon statute after which
Utah's is patterned,3 that the three prerequisites for an award of restitution are
criminal activity, pecuniary damages, and "a causal relationship between the two").4
It is similarly not certain that, "but for" the receipt of stolen goods, goods taken in a
burglary will be recovered. Nevertheless, this Court has previously held that the
causal link between the receipt of stolen goods and the victim's losses is sufficient
to support a restitution award. In re J.M.H., 924 P.2d at 897 (finding, in analysis of
juvenile restitution statute, causal link between receipt of stolen property and
damages to victim). Concealing stolen goods, like receiving stolen goods,
contributes directly to the victim's loss, thereby supporting the restitution award.
See Kelley v. State, 720 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding trial
court's restitution order on basis that "chop shop" operator, who received, concealed
and altered stolen goods, "caused" victim's losses even without evidence of his
actual involvement in theft).

3

See State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1992) (stating that Utah's statute is
"nearly identical to an Oregon statute from which it was patterned"); see also State v.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992).
4

This case is distinguishable from State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d
1289, cited by defendant. In that case, the court addressed the propriety of a restitution
order for costs of counseling incurred by a murder victim's family. Defendant in that
case pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for having sold a car used in a murder,
but did not admit responsibility for the murder. The court held that Watson could not be
required to pay restitution on the basis of her conviction for attempted obstruction of
justice because it did not result in any pecuniary damages. Id. at f 5.
12

Furthermore, this court has held it appropriate for a trial court to consider
rehabilitative and deterrent purposes and to order restitution to prevent injustice.
See State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992). An award of
restitution would prevent injustice in the instant case.
In sum, defendant admitted telling a "far-fetched" story falsely accounting for
her knowledge of the person from whom she received the pocket watch, jewelry,
and checks. By admitting to this prevarication, defendant admitted criminal
conduct, i.e., aiding in the concealment of the additional stolen property. This
criminal conduct was causally related to the victim's losses. The restitution order
encompassing all of the victim's losses from the burglary was therefore proper on
the basis of defendant's admitted criminal conduct. The restitution order was also
just.
Point II
Application of the restitution statute does not violate due process.
Defendant argues that the restitution order in this case violates defendant's
due process rights because she did not admit responsibility for the related burglary
and was not charged with or convicted of the burglary. Br. Aplt. at 18. She argues
that the restitution order therefore deprives her of her property without an
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 20.

13

The restitution order in this case is supported by defendant's admission to
criminal conduct causally related to the victim's pecuniary damages. Defendant
admitted to the sentencing judge that her account of her receipt of the jewelry and
checks was "far-fetched." She thereby admitted to falsely stating that she did not
know information relevant to the burglary. This was an admission of responsibility
for criminal conduct, i.e., concealing or aiding in the concealment of stolen
property. Defendant had a full opportunity to be heard on the issue of her criminal
responsibility and the scope of restitution. She did not suffer a deprivation of her
due process rights.
"[D]ue process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based
upon accurate and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App
273, f 8, 12 P.3d 110. A defendant has the right to notice and "the opportunity to be
fully heard." State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (discussing appropriateness of
restitution order).
Due process further requires that a restitution order, which deprives a
defendant of his property, be based on either evidence or admission of criminal
conduct from which "to place upon [the defendant] the responsibility for [the]
damage." In re Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1979) (analyzing juvenile
statute that pre-dated current version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201). Further, due
process demands that the criminal conduct admitted or proven have a clear causal

14

relationship with the damages for which restitution is awarded. Robinson, 860 P.2d
at 983.
Defendant here had an opportunity to respond and defend. She pled guilty to
receiving stolen property. At sentencing, she admitted responsibility for lying
which, in the context of this case, was an admission to responsibility for concealing
stolen property. Both at sentencing and at the restitution rehearing, she had an
opportunity to address the appropriate scope of restitution.
Defendant's admission sufficed to meet the requirements of due process. She
admitted to criminal conduct. That criminal conduct was causally related not just to
the victim's loss of the jewelry and checks, but to his loss of all the property taken
in the burglary.
In sum, defendant suffered no deprivation of due process. She had an
opportunity to be heard and defend. She admitted criminal conduct. Because her
admitted criminal conduct was causally related to the losses for which restitution
was ordered, the restitution order did not violate the demands of due process.
Point III
Should this court find the restitution order improper, it should clarify the
permissibility of reinstating fines and the proper scope of a restitution order.
Should the court determine that the restitution order is defective, it should
instruct the sentencing court that any fine suspended to facilitate the payment of
impermissible portions of the restitution order may be reinstated. It should further
15

clarify that a proper restitution order may include the value of two days' lost wages
suffered by the victim while responding to police interviews, attending court
proceedings, and addressing the stolen checks problem with his bank.5
At sentencing, the trial judge imposed a $1000 fine and a $200 attorneys' fees
recoupment. He then suspended the fine and the recoupment for the express
purpose of facilitating defendant's payment of the restitution order. He suspended
them on the assumption that defendant was "going to pay restitution in an amount
greater than . . . those amounts." R. 70:13-14. "I suspended . . . the fine . . . . [in]
anticipation of [defendant's] paying the $5000 restitution." R. 71:3. He reiterated
to defendant:

"[A]s a practical matter, it's going to be impossible for you to pay a

fine as well as the restitution and it's more important that the restitution get paid."
R. 71:13.
If this court determines that the sentencing court erred in requiring restitution
for losses occasioned by the theft of items not received, the restitution order will be
reduced from $5090 to $440. Should the sentencing court reimpose the fine and
recoupment fee, the court would require defendant to pay a total of $1660, far less
than the original restitution order.

5

Defendant has conceded that she should be responsible for those stolen items she
possessed when arrested. Br. Aplt. at 5. These included four rings, a pocket watch, and
one or more stolen checks. The sentencing court may therefore appropriately require
restitution for the cost of replacing stolen checks and repairing or replacing the rings and
pocket watch, if damaged or unreturnable.
16

While defendants enjoy constitutional and statutory protections against harsher
sentences after appeal, the sentencing court may, under the circumstances of this
case, reinstate the fine and recoupment fee without infringing on defendant's rights
because the resultant sentence would not be harsher than the original.
Defendant's rights limiting what sentence may be imposed at resentencing are
delineated in statute and case law. Section 76-3-405 of Utah Code Annotated
precludes the imposition of a new sentence which is more severe than a prior
sentence set aside on direct review. The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the
new sentence may not be harsher than the original sentence: due process requires
that a defendant "be free[] from the apprehension that if he appeals his conviction
successfully . . . the trial judge can retaliate by giving him an increased sentence."
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981). His Utah constitutional right to
appeal requires that he bear no "risk that he may be penalized with a harsher
sentence" for having successfully demonstrated some error below. Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omited). Further, one element of a sentence cannot be
increased because another element is decreased where "the possibility of such a
tradeoff could act as a deterrent to appeal by an individual defendant." Id. at 181.
A court cannot, following a successful appeal, resentence the defendant to a longer
term of incarceration but a smaller amount of restitution. Id. at 180.

17

In this case, however, reinstatement of the fine and recoupment would result
in a sentence clearly and measurably less harsh than the original. Neither the term
of incarceration nor the term of probation would change. Only defendant's financial
obligation would change—and it would decrease by almost $3500.
Furthermore, the judge here expressly suspended the fine and recoupment fee
to facilitate defendant's payment of restitution. His reinstatement of the fine or
recoupment fee at resentencing would not be retaliatory, but would only reflect the
change in the victim's ability to pay occasioned by the substantial reduction in her
restitution obligation.
Finally, fairness dictates that defendant should not reap a "windfall" where the
judge expressly suspended the fine and recoupment fee to help her pay the
restitution ordered. If, at resentencing, the judge imposes restitution for only $1660,
he should retain the discretion to reimpose the suspended fine and recoupment fee.
The sentencing court may also require defendant to pay restitution for the two
days' lost wages for time the victim spent with the police, in court, and at the bank.
Defendant's receipt of the stolen jewelry and checks caused these losses.
Oregon courts, construing the statute after which the Utah statute is patterned,
have held that costs incurred by victims in responding to a crime can be included in
a restitution order. See State v. Tuma, 637 P.2d 614, 615 (Or. 1981) (stating that
defendant, who burglarized home while victim was traveling, could be required to
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pay higher air fare or costs associated with forfeited prepaid lodging, if victim's
early return was the result of criminal activity); State v. Lindsly, 808 P.2d 727, 729
(Or. App. 1991) (holding that restitution order properly included investigative
expenses incurred by victim in responding to defendant's unauthorized use of
victim's equipment).
In sum, should this court require resentencing, it should clarify that the trial
judge may, in his discretion, reinstate the fine and fees suspended to permit payment
of the restitution originally ordered. The court should also clarify that restitution
may include all the costs incurred by the victim in responding to defendant's
criminal activity.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Should the court vacate the
restitution order, it should delineate the appropriate scope of a subsequent restitution
order and clarify that the sentencing court may reinstate any fine or fee suspended to
facilitate payment of the restitution originally ordered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on March^;, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
^ O c u ^

NNE B. INOUYE
sistant Attorney General
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PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorne/s fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may. impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5Xa)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch.
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19;
1995, ch. Ill, § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995,
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch.
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149,
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added
"or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement" and made a related change in Subsection (4Xa)(i).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection
(IXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection (2), and added
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4Xd)(iii).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc)" at the end of Subsection
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution;
added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redesignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc),
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2Xg), which read: "on or after April 29, 1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for life for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-

section (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification of and in Subsection
(4)(a)(i) added "Section" before "77-37-2."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3,
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections
(4)(a)(vii) and (4)(d)(iv).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998.
in Subsection (4Xa)(i) substituted "Subsection
(l)(e)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and
family member has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the
style of the internal references in Subsections
(5)(cXi), (5)(c)(ii), and (8Xc).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission"
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301,
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this section, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection
(4XaXvi).
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995;
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amendment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29,
1996.
Cross-References. — Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et
seq.
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq.
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq.
Restitution as condition of probation, § 7718-1.
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule
22, R.Crim.P.
Special release from city or county jail, purposes, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravating factors.
—Bodily injury to victim.
—Severity of offense.
—Sufficient.

Arrest record.
—Effect on sentence.
Credit for pretrial detention.
Discretion of court.
Effect of noncompliance.
Informal procedure.
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recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without takinj
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when hi
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures desig
nated in paragraph (1).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-407, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-407.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
§ 111 et seq.

C.J.S. — 52AC.J.S. Larceny § 18.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro
kers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the propert]
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably hai
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, oi
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in th<
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on z
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker oi
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used oi
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, oi
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
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person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1;
1993, ch. 102, § 1.

Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Elements.

ANALYSIS

—Concealing stolen property.
The elements in the crime of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property
are: (1) property belonging to another has been
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen;
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
—Receiving stolen property.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
—Insufficient.
—Sufficient.
Intent.
Separate offenses.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is
constitutional when read in light of § 76-1-503,
which provides that a presumption means only
that the issue of the presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless its existence is
clearly negated and that the jury may treat
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the
presumed fact, but does not disturb the requirement that the presumed fact, like all other
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454
(Utah 1976).
The phrase "believing that it probably has
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah
1976).
Applicability.
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits
its application to pawnbrokers and similar
businesses that generally deal in small purchases of secondhand consumer goods. It does
not include businesses that regularly deal in
large bulk orders of raw industrial material.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1993).

—Receiving stolen property.
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property are: property belonging to another has
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property
the defendant knew or believed the property
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely
to deprive the owner of the possession of the
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah
1980).
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential
element of the crime of receiving stolen property; state's proof that offense occurred on a
date different than that alleged in the information was not fatal to defendant's conviction for
receiving stolen property where the applicable
limitations statute had not run at the time the
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394
(Utah 1982).
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) The defendant received, retained, or disposed of the property of another, (2) knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment*
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
-0O0STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 001903706FS

vs.

SENTENCING
(Videotape Proceedings^

TARA KAY MAST,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of
August, 2000, commencing at the hour of 2:14 p.m., the
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following videotape proceedings were had.
-oOoA P P E A R A N C E S
For the State:

SERINA WISSLER
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
2001 South State, #S-3700
Salt Lake City, Utah
84190

For the Defendant:

JARED W. ELDRIDGE
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 1 8 2000

Association
_
424 East 50I^3fithir"5frT\e 300
Salt Lake Cltotlutfor I J4111
NOV 0 3 WO
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

ORIGINAL

3tS BftAHMA OftfVf (101)26*0320
r
SACT LAKC CTTY. UTAH M l 0 7

COURT OF APP

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

What do you have ready to go, you

guys?
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

Well, cold we call Tara Mast?

If that would put a smile on both

your face and that of Ms. Parkinson, I will do it.

You're

both far too pleasant to be professional barristers—and
I'm glad.

I don't want you to change.
Now, how are you?
MS. PARKINSON:
THE COURT:

I'm fine.

Good.

That was one of the nicest

kind of a skulking into court, that was wonderful.
(Inaudible)
THE COURT:
problem at all.

I know you were out, working.

No

(Inaudible)

MS. PARKINSON:

I—and I forgot my jacket today

and I apologize.
THE COURT:

Yes, and you look very professional,

there's no problem.
(Inaudible)
THE COURT:

Now, this is Tara Kay Mast standing

next to you, Mr. Eldridge?
MR. ELDRIDGE:

That's correct.

to be here last Monday for sentencing.

2

She was supposed

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. ELDRIDGE:

3

And didn't show.
Was not here and she's being held

in the jail until (inaudible) fit the schedule.

4

THE COURT:

Here for sentencing.

5

up for pre-sentence report either.

6

MR. ELDRIDGE:

7

I wonder how come.

There was a pre-sentence report

prepared.

8
9

She didn't show

THE COURT:

They told me she didn't show up for

it.

10

MR. ELDRIDGE:

11

THE COURT:

12 I

MR. ELDRIDGE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. ELDRIDGE:

I have one*

From A P & P?
Yeah.

Well, what are they recommending?
They're recommending six months in

15

the jail, restitution, $200 recoupment, successfully

16

complete drug court program, (inaudible) probation—

17
18

THE COURT:

Well, so they're recommending I stay

a commitment to prison then; is that right?

19

Ms. Wissler, do you feel comfortable standing in,

20

being the seasoned prosecutor you are, if I—if I can just

21

take a moment to peruse the pre-sentence report, I may be

22

willing to go ahead and follow that*

23

do that, Mr. Eldridge and Ms. Mast, and get you on your

24

way?

25

THE COURT:

Would you like me to

It sounds to me like it's favorable

if they're recommending the prison sentence is—is stayed.
I—I—you know, you may want to strike while the iron is
hot.
MR. ELDRIDGE: Would you like to look at this?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

If you—if you want to be

sentenced today.
It just seems to me it would be pretty hard to be
in a better position if we send it back to A P & P and ask
them for an update and you know, based—with the additional
little deal with the—with the no show.
You met Curtis Belnap at Odyssey House?
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:
MS. MAST:

Yes.
Is that right?
Uh huh.
Did you not like him or what?
I liked him.

THE COURT: Huh?
MS. MAST:

No, I liked him.

THE COURT: Who actually did the burglary at
Belnap's home, do you know?
MS* MAST:

I don't know.

It~I don't know.

It

wasn't me, I was not up there.
THE COURT: And it just happened that the checks
you were given just happened to be somebody that you were
at the Odyssey House with?

All those that believe that,

4

1
2

raise your hand.

No hands are being raised.

Well, let me say this, I'm surprised they're not

3

recommending a prison commitment.

4

know what you were expecting, given her criminal history,

5

but they're the experts.

6

recommendation of A P & P.

7

program is the—is the deal.

8
9

Mr. Eldridge, I don't

I'M wiling to follow the
I suppose the drug court

Ms. Mast, I will say this, I have had higher
comfort levels than I'm feeling right now about you

10

succeeding in probation.

11

you to, the reverse is true, we want you to succeed; but

12

please understand that if (inaudible) sentence here today,

13

the sentence would be the Utah State Prison and you'll have

14

to earn your way out of that by completing drug court,

15

serving your six months and completing probation.

16

That's not to say we don't want

If you violate by either re-offending, getting

17

involved in drug usage again and burglaries, forgeries or

18

whatever or if you simply aren't compliant with the

19

treatment, then if I see you again, it'll be simply to

20

impose the prison sentence.

21

The truth of it is, there are occasionally people

22

that we stay a commitment to prison for, that because of

23

very limited criminal history and maybe some other reasons,

24

who maybe do a false step or two and not have the prison

25

imposed; you would not be that.

I mean, I think you're

just obviously out, by the skin of your teeth, and I would
want to reinforce for you that you'll want to do everything
you possibly can to make sure you comply with probation.
Mr. Eldridge, do you want to go ahead and have
her be sentenced today then, follow the pre-sentence
report?
MR. ELDRIDGE:
be okay.

Judge, I—I think that that would

We'd just like to—to mention a couple of things.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

First of all, Judge, although

there is a criminal history here, there is a significant
(inaudible) gap in there.

She successfully went through

Odyssey House, stayed out of trouble for the last ten years
and just recently fell back (inaudible) caused her
problems*

And I think that may be part of the basis for

what the recommendation is, because she did do well before
and Odyssey House did make a difference and (inaudible)
Second of all, we'd just like to make the Court
aware that the drug court program, I don't believe it's the
drug court here, I believe it's the drug court through
Taylorsville—Taylorsville Justice Court, as I understand
it, city court.

So, it would be a misdemeanor-type drug

court, although they're going to provide some supervision
and keep track on that, and as well A P & P would—would be
supervising that as well*

6

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

But (inaudible) what she needs is

the structure, she's got the tools, she knows how to
address these problems, she just needs that structure of
someone—
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

—basically having to report in

and check in with someone to just give her the—to help
her.
THE COURT:

I understand.

Thank you, Mr.

Eldridge.
Ms. Wissler, anything to say?
MS. WISSLER:

No, your Honor, we'll submit it on

the pre-sentence report.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And anything else in your own behalf, Ms. Mast?
MS. MAST: 'No.
THE COURT:

It will be the judgment of the Court

in this matter that you be ordered committed to the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years as provided by law.

At this time, I will stay the

execution of the prison sentence.
Place you on probation with Adult Probation &
Parole for 36 months with the following conditions:
First condition is a six-month commitment to the

7

1

Salt Lake County Jail, giving you credit for time served

2

and ordering that to run concurrently.

3

You are obligated and ordered at this time to pay

4

restitution in the amount that is set forth in the pre-

5

sentence report at a monthly rate to be determined.

6

can be (inaudible)

That

7

MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, if we can just—under the

8

restitution, I don't be—I think that the reason why they

9

put that in there, there was where she passed a check,

10

there was no—she didn't get anything for it.

11

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

12 I

MR. ELDRIDGE:

She had some rings that were taken

13

in that burglary, apparently, and the restitution amount

14

there (inaudible) other items that were taken in the

15

burglary.

16

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Yeah.

I gave her a chance to

17

tell me about the burglary and she declined to do that, and

18

I'm convinced to a civil standard, which that—if you want

19

to request a restitution hearing, you can sure do that.

20

MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, I — I —

21

THE COURT:

But we're going to have to

22

(inaudible) that, too; so, you might want to talk with her

23

enough to kick that scab off or not.

24

MR. ELDRIDGE:

25

THE COURT:

I~

I gave her a chance to just
8

voluntarily talk about it and she didn't want to do that.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

Well, she told you what she knew

and—
THE COURT:

I told her what I thought about that,

too.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

Judge, I just don't—that's not

related to this case, that's a completely separate thing,
the burglary, that she's not charged with that here, she
hasn't pled to that.

The—the (inaudible) the burglary and

I don't—I don't believe—
THE COURT:

Okay.

Then I think—let's do a

restitution hearing then.
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

If—I'm going to go ahead and order a

restitution amount of $5,090 and you can notice that up and
we'll have her-MR. ELDRIDGE:

Could we just go ahead and set

that today for a restitution hearing?
MS. WISSLER:

Jared, could you—could you just

get with the prosecutor that's assigned to this case and
set a date for that?
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Yeah.

Let me just be real clear with

you, Ms. Mast, and that is, I'm not going to play word
games with you, you know and this stuff like, some friend

9

gave me a check and I don't remember and that kind of
stuff, I mean, I have no interest in placing you on
probation, period, with that kind of attitude.
You know, if—if—again, if—this is a rather
whimsical story, frankly, that it—that someone happens to
do a burglary in a community of, what, there's a million
and a half people in this valley and it just happens to be
someone in Odyssey House.
You know, if—I suppose it just sort of could
happen but the more whimsical it becomes, and some guy
named Fred, I don't know his last name, and that kind of
stuff, I suppose, you know, if you're interested in telling
us everything you know about the burglary, who gave you the
checks and that sort of thing, we can sure--I can sure do
that.
Do you want to talk to Mr. Eldridge before we set
that up or what do you want to do?
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:

Yeah.
You're telling me you don't know who

did the burglary; is that right?
MS. MAST:

I don't know, no.

wasn't involved in the burglary.

I don't know. I

The people and I wrote in

the pre-sentence report, the—you know the guy that came
and got me and actually, I thought it was this chick but I
(inaudible) and—

10

THE COURT:

And you didn't recognize the name

Curtis Belnap on the check?
MS. MAST:

Not until—as soon as I looked down,

passing it, then I recognized that I knew and those—and
then I—yeah, I understood what was going on; but I—no, I
was not involved in that burglary.
THE COURT:
then.

Okay.

Well, let me say this to you

I think we need to have these friends of your ex-

boyfriend brought in and we need—you need to I.D. them and
you need—we need to prosecute them, don't you think?
I mean, frankly, I mean, that's the first rule of
folklore.

It starts with friends of a friend.

The first

line of your statement is, friends of—this is even worse—
friends of my ex-boyfriend.

Right.

You know, and of

course, you don't know who they are and that kind of stuff,
you know, for someone who's asking not to be placed in
prison, I don't think it's just a good idea to tell those
kinds of things, that we euphemistically call folklore.
So, it just seems to me that—again, you can
make—take the choice, you can be jointly and severally
liable for the amounts of restitution or if you want to
hold a restitution hearing, then let's divulge all the
information.

And--

Why, are you just afraid of these people or what?
MS. MAST:

No, I just—I don't know who it is. I

11

1

mean, I —

2

THE COURT:

It's an every day occurrence, people

3

just gave you stolen checks and you don't know who they

4

are, but you happen to know the victim.

5

how implausible that is, people you don't know, you don't

6

know their names, are going to give you stolen checks, just

7

for the fun of it, and it turns out that the victim on the

8

stolen check, you were in Odyssey House with.

9

that even sound plausible to you?

10

MS. MAST:

11

THE COURT:

Does—does

It—it's pretty far-fetched, yeah.
Yeah, I agree.

That's a good way of

12

putting it.

13

a blank on who the people were that—that committed the

14

burglary, that gave you the stolen checks; is that right?

15
16

Yeah.

I mean, think of

MS. MAST:

And at this point, you're still drawing

I honestly don't know who it was, I

don't—I couldn't name them, I could not.

17

THE COURT: Who's your ex-boyfriend?

18

MS. MAST:

His name's Braden, but he had nothing

19

to do with this, he (inaudible) he had absolutely nothing

20

to do with this.

21

THE COURT: Yeah.

See, that's interesting, that-

22

-I wish we would have had this conversation before I

23

pronounced sentence, Mr. Eldridge.

24

from—this of the incongruity of that, Ms. Mast, for just a

25

moment.

See, she's so far away

You don't know who did the burglary but yet you're

12

willing to tell me that your ex-boyfriend didn't do it.
So—
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:

And he didn't—he wasn't around—
How do you know that?

If you don't

know who did it, then you wouldn't know that he didn't do
it.
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:

Well, okay.
Okay.

So, you want to be big, tough

and take—you know, and show people, so go do it.
MS. MAST:

I'm not being—I'm not trying to be

big and tough and show anybody nothing.
THE COURT:

I—I don't know.

Well, I'll use your word back, far-

fetched.
Okay.

Well, talk to your client, Mr. Eldridge,

and if you want it set for a restitution hearing, we can
certainly do that if that's what you decide to do.
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you.

It'll be the judgment of the

Court then, the prison sentence is stayed six—36 months'
probation, six months in the county jail, ordered to pay
restitution, jointly and severally.

And I'm going to

impose a $1,000 fine and a $200 attorney's fees recoupment.
I will stay the—and suspend the payment of the
fine and the payment of the attorney's fees recoupment,
assuming that she's going to pay restitution in an amount

13

greater than—than those amounts.
You'll need to main—successfully complete the
drug court program, maintain full-time, verifiable
employment, do not use drugs or alcohol while on probation.
MS. MAST:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Ms. Mast, you'll have to undergo

random periodic urine screens and submit to chemical
testing at the request of your probation officer.
Please understand, Ms. Mast, you're not even to
frequent places or be with people that are using illicit
drugs.

You can't go in places where drugs are being used.

And I want you to stay out of taverns and bars, or places
where alcohol is a cheap item to order.
Comply fully with your probation and you'll not
have to—you'll not be committed to the Utah State Prison.
At some point in time while on probation, if you
decide—if you either glean information or suddenly have a
better recollection and you think it would be fair if
someone shared in the restitution and you could certainly
provide those names to your probation officer; but unless
and until we order otherwise, of course, you'd be liable
for the restitution.
Mr. Eldridge, I affirmatively again so there's no
misunderstanding, I will clear the fine and as well as the
attorney's fee recoupment in light of the fact that—and at

14

1

some level I suppose one could say that it's unfair that

2

she's paying restitution for folks that—because she can't

3

remember their names.

4

regard and that's the best I can do for her today.

5
6

So, I'll at least help her to that

Thank you, (inaudible) it was nice to see you.
So, what else do you have, Mr. Eldridge?

7

MR. ELDRIDGE:

That's it.

8 |

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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* * *
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12
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13
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14

HONORABLE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON, sitting as Judge in the

15

above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that

16

the following videotape proceedings were had.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELDRIDGE:
Mast matter.

Mr. Eldridge?

Your Honor, I'm here on the Tara

She#s in custody.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

I'm not sure exactly what we—how

we are going to proceed (inaudible) I'm not sure if the
State has—
THE COURT:

Did you bring a file, Ms. Bernards-

Goodman?
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:
THE COURT:

What?

Did you bring a file?

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

Yes.

I have the file but

I didn't know we had a motion hearing today.
THE COURT:

This cuts to the issue of the

restitution and Mr. Eldridge's position is that Ms. Mast
should be responsible only for the portion of the
restitution having to do with the specific items that she
was convicted of, in terms of the theft by receiving.
And the value of the ring of $1,000 and your
claim is that the other items taken in the burglary, she
should not be responsible for, only those items for which
she entered a plea.
And—and let me say this, I—I think that that's

2

generally right with the exception that, if I had some
information, I guess, Mr. Eldridge, that in fact Ms. Mast's
involvement is limited to simply receiving those rings that
were—which she was found—when I—at the time of
sentencing, we gave Ms. Mast an opportunity to talk about
that and frankly, I wasn't overly impressed with the view—
with her view of what occurred.

And I don't have the

benefit of full police reports, but that's kind of where we
are.
I also should indicate that I suspended—was it
$1,000 for the fine?
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

I believe so.

Yeah.

In anticipation of paying the

$5,000 in restitution and I suppose if I understand your
position correctly, Mr. Eldridge, that is that the
restitution should be amended down to $1,000 and that then
she would simply pay the $1,000 fine and the $1,000
restitution and it looks like attorney recoupment of $200
and be excused from paying the other $4,000 of restitution.
I guess that's a $3,000 plus-up for her and certainly if
that's the fair, right thing to do, I'm willing to do that;
but if she is a — a party to the underlying offense, I—I
guess I'm just not going to—you know, the fact that she—
well, it—it seems—I'm just not convinced at all that she
has no involvement or knowledge of the burglary whatsoever.

3

1
2

Ms. Bernards-Goodman, what's your position on
this?

3
4

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

Well, your Honor, I do

note that the burglary occurred that very same day—

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.

6

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

—which—which gives me a

7

presumption that even though she may not be the person who

8

goes over and commits the burglary, she's right there when

9

they come back, obviously.

10

And—and I know this may be a little outside the

11

norm, but it's my feeling that the Court is too generous

12

when it comes to restitution concerns on behalf of the

13

defendant.

14

yourself involved in things like possession of stolen—

15

possession of stolen property, then you open yourself up to

16

the concerns of restitution for whatever may have been

17

taken, along with that stolen property.

18 I

It's—my feeling is that if you're going to get

So many times, we have people come in here and

19

they only want to be responsible for, you know, when ten

20

people were kicking on a car, they only want to pay for the

21

one dent they made, rather than everything that happened in

22

that criminal episode.

23

For someone to be involved as part of an ongoing

24

criminal episode and it's happening pretty quick and by

25

possessing that stolen property, she leaves herself open to

all the losses of that victim, no matter how they occurred
in that vein, they occurred.

The victim should not be a

person who ends up short-changed here,
THE COURT:

And I guess the one other factor, and

again, I just want Mr, Eldridge to respond, again, your
very thoughtful and your—your motion's very well written,
your arguments before were good; you know, if there were—
if it were the kind of fact type of burglary that occurred
six months before and there was any plausible explanation
as to how she got this, other than with full knowledge of
the burglary occurring and—it would be a different thing;
but it was the absolute, you know, immediacy.
And not only do we have the ring--the rings, I
guess, and the watch, but the forgery involves checks taken
in that same burglary and it is so—I guess what I'm
saying, Ms. Mast, to you and to you through your attorney
is, I'm certainly not going to take at face value simply
your self-serving declaration to A P & P in its report,
that I knew nothing about the theft and burglary, but
somehow magically and mystically, literally within hours of
the burglary, you have a check—you have checks, a watch
and rings taken in the burglary and yet, know nothing about
a burglary.
And that just doesn't even pass the basic smell
test.

So, I think I invited you before to share candid

5

information regarding—about the burglary, then if—you
know, if in fact, you don't know about it, you know, how is
that even possible?
So, I just see a couple of options at this point.
Number one, I—I understand that there—that you aren't
comfortable about the restitution because there are unnamed
people who profited from him and you're kinda getting
blocked for the whole thing.

I understand how you feel

about that and that's frankly the reason that I ordered the
$1,000 of the fine suspended, you know, to—to put some—in
one sense, trying to level that.
But—and certainly, I can deny the motion and
the—and the sentence can stand and I guess Mr. Eldridge
can do what he wants to with the Court of Appeals if he
thinks that's an abuse of discretion.
Number two, I don't have a problem with
continuing this and allowing you to speak with either law
enforcement officials or A P & P representatives, if you—
if there is information that you (A) have, and (B) want to
disclose regarding the burglary and allowing others to be
brought to justice who either participated in or in fact
have the items; or (C) we can schedule a—an evidentiary
hearing.
And I don't disagree with—violently with the law
stated by Mr. Eldridge, just to say this, if there is an

6

1

absence of information, if all the evidentiary hearing is

2

going to show is that there was a burglary and within—

3

literally within hours of that burglary, you have a

4

checkbook, rings and a watch that were taken in the

5

burglary and there's some other missing items, and if there

6

is no information either from the defense or from the State

7

as to how the burglary was convicted—was committed, who

8

else was involved in it, I can tell you right now, I'm not

9

going to change the order and I'm going to leave the

10
11

restitution at $5,000.
If the Court of Appeals wants to take a different

12

view of that, they can; but I think that Ms, Bernards-

13

Goodman certainly expresses the in—legislative intent with

14

respect to victims' rights legislation and I think what the

15

Court ought to do in absence of—of evidence otherwise.

16

I think there is some inferential—you do not

17

have the burden of proof, but I would say this, in the a b —

18

given the facts of this case, the very close proximity in

19

time and the absence of other information, this is a civil

20

standard, after all, not a criminal standard, beyond a

21

reasonable doubt.

22

And my finding of fact is, I'm convinced at this

23

point, the information, by a simple preponderance of the

24

evidence, that Ms. Mast had knowledge of the burglary and

25

participated as a—and theft, as a party to that offense.

Mr. Eldridge, what—what—do you have any—you're
welcome to have the benefit of the record, to make any
record you'd like to or argument or suggestion you want to
make today, sir.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

Well, your Honor, I guess our

position is, is that looking at the restitution—the
restitution statutes under, I guess 76-3-201—
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

—Subsection (4) and I guess

that's really Sub (A) Sub (i), it indicates that
restitution shall be ordered for pecuniary damages that
result from a criminal activity that the defendant has been
convicted of or has agreed to make restitution as part of a
plea agreement.
The—the statute also describes or defines
criminal activities as any offense for which the defendant
is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the
defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court
with or without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct itself.
So, our position is, is Ms. Mast has not been
convicted of burglary, she's not admitted or agreed as part
of a plea bargain to pay restitution for items taken in the
burglary.

She's never even admitted responsibility for the

burglary and therefore, under this statute, I think that

8

1

she can't be ordered to pay the restitution for items taken

2

in the burglary*

3

She can certainly be ordered to pay restitution

4

for any sort of pecuniary loss that stems—her criminal

5

activity for which she pled guilty to and which she admits

6

responsibility for, which would be the theft by receiving,

7

of which the rings were recovered, unless there's some sort

8

of damage to the rings.

9

made on that already.

I think that restitution has been

And—and that's restitution that she

10

ought to be rightfully held to and that's, I think, what

11

serves the interest of justice here.

12
13

And that's—that's basically our position, your
Honor.

14

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

And I don't think what the

15

Court has ordered is outside that statute.

16

charged with and admitted receiving stolen property.

17

is part of the property, the property is a package as a

18

whole and she's got part of it, she should get to pay for

19

all of it.

20

MR. ELDRIDGE:

She has been
This

Your Honor, I—I would just add

21

also, I think ordering her to pay restitution for items

22

taken in a burglary also infringes upon her right to due

23

process.

24

that's never been an issue, that's never been litigated,

25

it's never been through court, she's never had an

She's never been charged with that burglary,

opportunity to—to really respond to that in the sense of
litigation.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Actually, that's well said.

Let me say this and again, I'm not suggesting for a moment
the State under-charged the case or should have charged a
burglary.

There's absolutely no way they could prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed the burglary,
they can't put her at the crime scene, either.
presumed innocent.

She's

There is no plausible way that she

should be charged with the burglary; but again, let me just
focus on the specific facts of this case and the utterances
made by Ms. Mast.
And again, if she wants to be sworn in, put under
oath, we'll let her do it if she wants to—to change any
statement that she's made, but this is the information upon
which I need to make a ruling, and that is again, (A) that
she attempts to pass a forged check which was taken in a
residential burglary in a very close time to the—to the
incident of the passing of the check; that she is
disingenuous, if not dishonest, at the time of the
apprehension and initially stated that the rings and gold
pocket watch belonged to her.
So, I guess what I'm saying is, I have a person
who apparently, not only has a—doesn't have a problem in
passing forged checks, but in also misrepresenting and
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being disingenuous, if not just flat-out—flat-out
untruthful.
And as it turns out, not only were the checks
taken in a residential burglary, but the four men's rings,
and again, this isn't like something for her personal use.
I don't presume that she's going to personally wear four
men's rings, but—and a gold pocket watch.

And so I—I

think it's just critical to note that Ms. Mast is, at this
point, the recipient of items that were recently taken in a
residential burglary and I think a fair inference, again to
a civil standard, is, those items are being held for
disposition, not for use.
And then, following a Miranda warning, Ms. Mast
makes the statement that an unnamed male friend gave her
the checks and the jewelry.

And that this male friend,

however, is unknown; he's such a good friend that he'll
give her jewelry items and she'll take them, but that she
can't even remember his name or can she provide a
description of him.
In my view, that is—again, not that it's proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or (inaudible) more into that,
that, in my view, clearly meets a civil standard of
demonstrating her involvement in—in a theft.

And that it

is so farcical and whimsical to believe for a moment that
someone that she doesn't even know well enough to know his
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name and can't even describe him is just for the fun of it,
going to give him (sic) valuable items of jewelry.
is just—could it happen?
reasonable doubt?

Sure.

It—it

Is it proof beyond a

Absolutely not.

But that being said, it seems to me that it i s —
clearly meets any evidentiary burden that the State would
have in terms of a—of demonstrating Ms. Mast's involvement
in a, quote, criminal activity under the terms of the
statute.
And I think it's also interesting that the
statute doesn't talk about the criminal offense for which
she entered the plea, but the criminal activity.
And so the burden, it seems to me, is that as the
finder of fact and sentencing judge in this matter, Mr.
Eldridge, and Ms. Bernards-Goodman, is that should I go
beyond the specific offense for which she was convicted,
i.e., the theft by receiving?
I think the answer is yes, but only if there is
to at least a civil standard, a showing that the—of the
criminal activity, part of which was the specific offense
for which she was convicted.
She was convicted of theft by receiving growing
out of items taken in a theft and residential burglary.
There, it seems to me, is such a close nexus in terms of
time and there is such a insufficient explanation for how
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she acquired these items and it appears on the face of it
to be just simply unreasonable and unbelievable, frankly.
And Ms, Mast's refusal to provide any additional
information on which I could—I could base any other
ruling, I'll find that the State through the pre-sentence
report in fact has established to a sufficient civil
standard, the—Ms. Mast's participation in a criminal
activity resulting in an economic loss, as previously
ordered by this Court.
That's a long way of saying, Mr. Eldridge, that
I'm, at this time, denying the motion to alter or amend the
judgment and ordering that Ms. Mast's prior sentence
wherein she was placed on probation to A P & P and ordered
to be responsible for restitution as outlined still stands.
And again, the fine is suspended in its entirety
for the reason that I think it's—as a practical matter,
it's going to be impossible for you to pay a fine as well
as the restitution and it's more important that the
restitution get paid as a priority.
So I'm clearing the fine in its entirety and
ordering that she pay the restitution as ordered by
A P & P.
Let me ask one other question.

It wasn't clear

to me from the pre-sentence report, didn't homeowners'
insurance pick up and pay for part of that?
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MR, ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

I don't remember.

Do you know?

'Cause let me say, you

know, the truth of it is, a judge can order all he or she
wants, but it's not going to happen if it doesn't happen.
It reminds me of the daylight savings, we can
change our watches, we don't change the sun, do we?
And I'm not sure that I can order that Ms. Mast
acquire $5,000. That's not to say that she's not legally
responsible for it.
I would have no objection, Mr. Eldridge and Ms.
Mackey (sic) if what she actually pays is the homeowner
deductible and make that a condition of criminal probation,
if that's not paid, it's revoked and she goes to jail.
And the portion that is essentially an insurance
subrogation claim be—pursuant to statute, be docketed as a
civil judgment.

Again, I'm not ordering that, I'm just

saying that perhaps A P & P should look at that when Ms.
Mast is released from custody and see where—what her
earning capacity is.
And if it is simply beyond her ability to pay the
$5,000, which I'm going to guess that it may well be, you
know, there may be a $500 insurance deductible that we need
to, for sure, collect in cash, pay it on to the home owner
and then, by law, the insurance company is entitled to be
treated as a victim and is entitled to have a civil
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judgment.
And I'm not certain that absent a showing of her
ability to do it, that we can enforce that, the actual
payment of a — I think we can't turn the jail into debtor's
prison, I guess is what I'm saying.

And oftentimes, the

payment of the deductible and the conversion to a civil
judgment is the right way to handle those.
The insurance company gets the benefit, not—not
having to hire a lawyer, don't have to do the subrogation
claim and they get their judgment and if Ms. Mast can pay
it, eventually—ultimately, during the eight years while
that judgment is extant, then she does and if not, she
doesn't.
But I just throw that open, that that might be a
practical resolution.

I think it would be unfortunate in—

in these or other similar type cases that we exalt the
reimbursement to insurance companies at such a high level
that it takes precedent over drug rehab or other kinds of
things that are probably of more directly interest to
A P & P.
And so what I'm saying, Ms. Mackey, if you want
to convert that portion to a civil judgment, then you can
certainly do that.
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:
make a note of that.
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Okay, your Honor, I'll

THE COURT: okay.

If they want to and I'm not

ordering it, that's just an option, and if you—
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

—agree to, that's fine.

Mr. Eldridge, what else, sir?
MR. ELDRIDGE:

Judge, as long as we're here, it's

kind of on an unrelated issue with respect to Ms. Mast.
Part of her sentence was, she was given credit for time
served.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

The jail has only given her credit

for about a week.
THE COURT:
away.

I just put the pre-sentence report

How long would she serve?
MR* ELDRIDGE:

The pre-sentence report indicates

62 days.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We can notify the jail that

the commitment is to include 60—whatever the pre-sentence
says is what I'm going to validate•
MR. ELDRIDGE:
THE COURT:

Okay?

It's right here.

That works, doesn't it?

MR. ELDRIDGE:

Yes. That would be—that would be

great, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We'll do that.

Now, Ms. Mast, I hope you'll look forward.
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You--

1

A P & P wants to work with you, I suspended the prison

2

sentence.

3

soul into when you're released from custody, comply and get

4

the help you need to get out of the circumstance that you

5

were in.

6

I—I think you need to just throw your heart and

You know, I'm not exactly sure what's motivating

7

you to protect those that beguiled you and got you into

8

this situation, but maybe part of it's out of fear, or

9

whatever; but in any event, I'm not compelling you, not

10

ordering you to disclose who did the burglary.

11

your choices in that regard.

12

behind you, you need to comply fully with A P & P, get in

13

those treatment programs, get the help you need*

14

You've made

You just need to put it

I hope that it can be worked out so you're only

15

paying the out-of-pocket deductible and I think that's

16

going to make your life work out okay.

All right?

17

MS. MAST:

Thank you.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. ELDRIDGE: Thanks.

20 J

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

Thanks, Mr. Eldridge.

21
22 |

* * *

23
24
25
17

Thanks.
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